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It was long assumed that the capacity to represent false beliefs did not emerge until
at least age four, as evidenced by children’s performance on elicited-response tasks.
However, recent evidence that infants appear to demonstrate false-belief understanding
when tested with alternative, non-elicited-response measures has led some researchers
to conclude that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in the 1st year of life.
This mentalistic view has been criticized for failing to offer an explanation for the well-
established positive associations between social factors and preschoolers’ performance
on elicited-response false-belief tasks. In this paper, we address this criticism by offering
an account that reconciles these associations with the mentalistic claim that false-
belief understanding emerges in infancy. We propose that rather than facilitating the
emergence of the capacity to represent beliefs, social factors facilitate the use of this
ability via effects on attention, inference, retrieval, and response production. Our account
predicts that the relationship between social factors and false-belief understanding
should not be specific to preschoolers’ performance in elicited-response tasks: this
relationship should be apparent across the lifespan in a variety of paradigms. We review
an accumulating body of evidence that supports this prediction.
Keywords: false-belief understanding, psychological reasoning, mental-state talk, social cognition, social
understanding
INTRODUCTION
Many everyday interactions involve predicting and interpreting others’ behavior on the basis of
their mental states (e.g., goals, preferences, and beliefs). Researchers have long been interested in
when and how the ability to attribute mental states to others develops. In particular, considerable
research has focused on when children understand that others can be mistaken, or hold false beliefs,
about the world. Traditionally, false-belief understanding was investigated using elicited-response
tasks, which require children to answer direct questions about the behavior of a mistaken agent.
In one such task (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), children hear a story enacted with props: Sally
puts a marble in a basket; in her absence, the marble is moved to a nearby box. Children are
then asked, “Where will Sally look for her marble?” Beginning around age 4, children correctly say
that Sally will look in the basket, where she falsely believes it to be. In contrast, younger children
incorrectly respond that Sally will look for the marble in its actual location, suggesting a failure
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to appreciate Sally’s false belief. This widely replicated finding led
many to conclude that children cannot represent false beliefs until
at least age 4 (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001).
Recently, however, researchers have developed a variety of
alternative non-elicited-response paradigms for assessing false-
belief understanding, the results of which suggest that this ability
might be present much earlier than previously thought. Positive
results have been obtained with children between 6 months and
3 years of age using these alternative measures (for a review,
see Scott et al., in press). For instance, infants visually anticipate
where a mistaken agent will search for an object (e.g., Southgate
et al., 2007; Senju et al., 2011; He et al., 2012; Surian and
Geraci, 2012), look reliably longer when an agent’s actions are
inconsistent with her false belief (e.g., Onishi and Baillargeon,
2005; Surian et al., 2007; Song and Baillargeon, 2008; Scott and
Baillargeon, 2009; Luo, 2011), and use an agent’s false belief to
guide their own helping behaviors (e.g., Buttelmann et al., 2009;
Knudsen and Liszkowski, 2012) as well as their interpretation
of a mistaken agent’s communicative acts (Southgate et al.,
2010).
Advocates of mentalistic accounts argue that these recent
findings demonstrate that false-belief understanding emerges in
the 1st year of life (e.g., Leslie, 2005; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian
et al., 2007; Buttelmann et al., 2009; Kovács et al., 2010; Luo, 2011;
Carruthers, 2013; Baillargeon et al., 2015; Scott et al., in press).
However, others have argued that responses in non-elicited-
response tasks do not reflect a genuine understanding of belief
and are instead driven by more limited, rudimentary capacities,
such as low-level perceptual novelty (e.g., Heyes, 2014), learned
behavioral rules (e.g., Ruffman, 2014), or a system for tracking
belief-like states (e.g., Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). According
to these late-emergence accounts, false-belief understanding does
not emerge until age four, as indicated by success on elicited-
response tasks.
The merits of these accounts have been extensively debated
elsewhere (e.g., Butterfill and Apperly, 2013; Heyes, 2014;
Ruffman, 2014; Scott, 2014; Scott and Baillargeon, 2014; Scott
et al., 2015; Carruthers, 2016, in press; Christensen and Michael,
2016; Low et al., 2016; Michael and Christensen, 2016), and
we will not repeat those arguments here. Instead, we take up
a specific challenge to mentalistic accounts that has yet to be
addressed in the literature: the criticism that mentalistic accounts
do not address the relationship between social factors and false-
belief performance (e.g., San Juan and Astington, 2012; Ruffman,
2014). We first briefly review the evidence for this relationship
and then offer a new account that reconciles these findings with
the mentalistic claim that false-belief understanding emerges in
infancy.
SOCIAL EXPERIENCE AND
PRESCHOOLERS’ FALSE-BELIEF
PERFORMANCE
Preschoolers’ performance on elicited-response false-belief tasks
is correlated with a variety of social factors (e.g., Perner et al.,
1994; Holmes et al., 1996; Dunn and Cutting, 1999; Hughes
et al., 1999; Meins et al., 2003; Lecce and Hughes, 2010; Mayer
and Träuble, 2013; McAlister and Peterson, 2013; for detailed
discussions of these factors and children’s social experience,
see Carpendale and Lewis, 2004; Wellman, 2014; Taumoepeau,
2015). For instance, preschoolers from larger families (e.g.,
Perner et al., 1994) and those with same-aged or older siblings
(e.g., McAlister and Peterson, 2013) show superior performance
on elicited-response false-belief tasks. There is also a well-
established positive relationship between preschoolers’ false-
belief performance and mental-state language: terms that refer to
psychological states such as think, know, and understand (Brown
et al., 1996; Nielsen and Dissanayake, 2000; Ruffman et al., 2002;
Adrián et al., 2005; Ensor and Hughes, 2008; Howard et al., 2008).
Parents’ use of mental-state terms in both laboratory settings and
home environments predicts their preschoolers’ performance on
elicited-response tasks concurrently (e.g., Howard et al., 2008)
and longitudinally (e.g., Ruffman et al., 2002). Training that
exposes preschoolers to additional mental-talk improves their
elicited-response performance (e.g., Lohmann and Tomasello,
2003; Taumoepeau and Reese, 2013). Moreover, deaf children
raised by hearing parents, who hear fewer references to mental
states than their hearing counterparts, exhibit deficits in elicited-
response performance (Gale et al., 1996; Moeller and Schick,
2006; Meristo et al., 2007), as do children from cultures where
parents do not typically discuss mental states with their children
(Mayer and Träuble, 2013; Taumoepeau, 2015). Preschoolers’
performance on elicited-response tasks is also related to their own
personal use of mental-state language in naturalistic settings such
as free play with peers (e.g., Brown et al., 1996) and in laboratory
settings (e.g., Ruffman et al., 2002).
From the perspective of late-emergence accounts, the
reason for these associations is straightforward: certain social
experiences facilitate the emergence of the ability to represent
false beliefs, which in turn leads to successful performance
in elicited-response tasks. Several such explanations have been
proposed (Meins et al., 2003; Carpendale and Lewis, 2004;
de Villiers, 2005; Nelson, 2005; Ensor and Hughes, 2008;
San Juan and Astington, 2012; Ruffman, 2014; Taumoepeau
and Ruffman, 2016). For instance, some have suggested that
these social experiences both afford children the opportunity
to reflect on the mind and confront them with the fact that
others’ thoughts and feelings can differ from their own (e.g.,
Ruffman et al., 1999; Carpendale and Lewis, 2004; Harris, 2005;
Ensor and Hughes, 2008); this helps children construct mental-
state concepts, including the concept of belief, and link those
concepts to behavior (San Juan and Astington, 2012; Ruffman,
2014; Taumoepeau and Ruffman, 2016). Conversations involving
mental-state language have been argued to be especially helpful in
this regard: by providing explicit labels for mental-state concepts,
epistemic verbs such as think and know help children detect
patterns of behavior across disparate situations, thereby leading
to an abstract understanding of how mental states translate into
action (e.g., San Juan and Astington, 2012). Finally, some have
argued that the syntactic structure in which epistemic verbs occur
(e.g., sentential complements: She thinks that it is raining) is
necessary for explicitly representing and reasoning about beliefs
(e.g., de Villiers, 2005).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1721
fpsyg-07-01721 November 1, 2016 Time: 17:2 # 3
Roby and Scott Social Experience and False-Belief Understanding
A MENTALISTIC ACCOUNT OF THIS
RELATIONSHIP
Several researchers have criticized mentalistic accounts for not
yet providing an explanation for the relationships described
above (San Juan and Astington, 2012; Ruffman, 2014). If the
capacity to represent beliefs emerges in infancy, as argued by
mentalistic accounts, then it cannot be the case that social
experience gives rise to this ability. Why then do social factors
predict false-belief performance?
We propose that rather than facilitating the emergence of the
ability to represent beliefs, social factors facilitate the use of this
ability. We assume that the ability to represent beliefs emerges
in infancy, as demonstrated by children’s performance on non-
elicited-response tasks. However, the capacity to represent beliefs
does not guarantee success in elicited- or non-elicited-response
tasks: a number of factors mediate between this capacity and
successful performance in any given situation (e.g., Lewis and
Osborne, 1990; Leslie and Polizzi, 1998; Bloom and German,
2000; Baillargeon et al., 2010; Rubio-Fernández and Geurts, 2013;
Helming et al., 2014; Scott and Roby, 2015; Scott et al., in
press). Below we outline several such factors and discuss how
social experience might interact with these factors to influence
children’s false-belief reasoning.
Attention
In order to infer an agent’s false belief, one must attend to that
agent’s behavior and any belief-relevant information within a
scene. Social experiences might affect false-belief performance in
part by influencing how individuals attend to social situations.
Social interactions that focus on other individuals, such as
conversations about others’ mental states or play with peers
and siblings, might increase interest in agents and their mental
states. Individuals who frequently engage in such interactions
might be more inclined to attend to agents over other aspects
of a scene. Social experience might also encourage individuals
to attend selectively to specific aspects of an agent’s behavior
that are relevant to inferring that agent’s mental states. For
instance, although infants are sensitive to eye contact from birth
(Farroni et al., 2002), social experience appears to shape the
way in which children attend to and use gaze information:
sighted infants of blind parents devote less attention to others’
eyes and to the targets of others’ gaze than do infants of
sighted parents, and this difference increases with age (Senju
et al., 2015). Finally, events that disrupt attention to agents
interfere with children’s and adults’ false-belief performance
(Rubio-Fernández, 2013; Rubio-Fernández and Geurts, 2013).
Individuals who routinely engage in other-focused interactions
might be better at sustaining attention to agents and belief-
relevant information and thus be more resistant to such
disruptive effects.
Inference
Attending to an agent does not guarantee that one will
successfully infer that agent’s mental states or reason about that
agent’s subsequent actions: one might be unable to create a
causal model of the events unfolding within the scene due to
a lack of situational knowledge (e.g., Christensen and Michael,
2016). To illustrate, consider an item from the Strange Stories
task (White et al., 2009): participants read a story in which a
nervous woman is walking home at night when a man approaches
her to ask the time; the woman says, “Take my purse, just
don’t hurt me please!” Participants are asked why she said this.
To respond correctly, participants must use contextual cues to
infer that the woman falsely believed the man was a robber.
School-aged children have difficulty with this and other advanced
mental-state reasoning tasks that require them to infer beliefs
and desires based on subtle situational cues, even though they
are certainly capable of representing such mental states (e.g.,
Devine and Hughes, 2013; Bianco et al., 2016). Interacting with
peers and siblings and discussing others’ mental states might
facilitate the acquisition of the situational knowledge needed to
build causal models of scenarios such as the one just described
(perhaps in the form of schemas, Christensen and Michael,
2016). This in turn would result in an improved ability to
infer others’ mental states in a range of situations based on the
(sometimes limited) information available (e.g., Bianco et al.,
2016).
Retrieval
Successful false-belief reasoning sometimes requires retrieving
from memory information about types of social situations
(as just discussed), events that recently occurred in a specific
situation, or mental states that one had previously attributed
to an agent in that situation. Social interactions might facilitate
access to this information via the creation of retrieval cues.
In particular, learning and using mental-state terms likely
provides an especially useful tool for retrieving belief-relevant
information, as well as holding that information in mind while
planning a response to an agent or to a question about that
agent.
Responding
Assuming that one successfully attends to, infers, and retrieves
an agent’s false belief, social factors might facilitate the ability
to generate appropriate responses based on that belief in
several ways. First, we have argued that when children are
asked the test question in traditional elicited-response false-
belief tasks (e.g., “Where will Sally look for her marble?”), this
initiates a response-selection process: children must interpret
the test question and select an appropriate response (e.g.,
Baillargeon et al., 2010; Scott and Roby, 2015; Scott et al., in
press). This response-selection process often triggers a prepotent
bias to respond based on reality, and this response must be
inhibited in order to answer based on the agent’s false belief
(response-inhibition process). Several sources of difficulty likely
contribute to this bias: pragmatic factors might cause children
to misinterpret the question as asking where the marble is or
where Sally ought to look to find it, mentioning the marble
might draw children’s attention to its location, and children’s
own knowledge may be naturally more salient (Leslie and
Polizzi, 1998; Hansen, 2010; Rubio-Fernández and Geurts, 2013;
Helming et al., 2014; Baillargeon et al., 2015). Frequently
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1721
fpsyg-07-01721 November 1, 2016 Time: 17:2 # 4
Roby and Scott Social Experience and False-Belief Understanding
engaging in social interactions that involve discussion of others’
mental states, especially those involving direct questions (e.g.,
Howard et al., 2008), might help children overcome pragmatic
difficulties and correctly interpret the experimenter’s question.
Similarly, social interactions might provide practice inhibiting
one’s own beliefs and desires in order to focus on those
of another, thereby facilitating correct responding in elicited-
response tasks.
Because children are not asked direct questions in non-
elicited-response tasks, the response-selection process is not
activated and thus no prepotent responses are generated.
However, recent evidence suggests that under some
circumstances, non-elicited-response tasks might involve
some form of inhibition that is unrelated to the response-
selection process (e.g., Yott and Poulin-Dubois, 2012; Wang and
Leslie, 2016). Social experiences that improve inhibition might
therefore facilitate performance in these tasks as well.
Second, consider recent non-elicited-response false-belief
tasks in which children are prompted to help a mistaken
agent (e.g., Buttelmann et al. 2009, 2014, 2015). In order to
assist the agent, not only must children use the agent’s false
belief to infer the agent’s likely goal, but they must also (1)
understand that the agent needs help, (2) realize that they
are capable of helping and choose to do so, (3) determine
how they could best assist, and (4) plan and execute that
helping response. Successful responding thus requires children
to integrate multiple inferences about the agent’s mental states
with inferences about their own knowledge and capabilities in
order to produce appropriate helping behavior. Social experience
likely plays a critical role in developing such integrative
abilities.
PREDICTIONS FROM THIS
MENTALISTIC ACCOUNT
The preceding analysis has implications for the relationship
between social factors and false-belief understanding. If social
factors facilitate the use, rather than the emergence, of mental-
state concepts, then there is no reason why the relationship
between these factors and false-belief understanding should be
specific to preschoolers’ performance on elicited-response tasks:
this relationship should be evident across the lifespan in a
variety of tasks. This leads to at least two specific predictions
regarding the relationship between social experience and false-
belief performance.
First, social experience should be related to children’s
performance on non-elicited-response false-belief tasks prior
to age four. Although these tasks do not require children to
answer direct questions about a mistaken agent’s behavior, they
require children to attend to, infer, and retrieve an agent’s
false beliefs. If social factors facilitate these processes, as we
have argued, then these factors should be positively associated
with younger children’s performance on non-elicited-response
tasks. Consistent with this prediction, Meristo et al. (2012)
found that 23-month-old deaf infants raised by hearing parents
failed a non-elicited-response false-belief task, whereas hearing
infants of hearing parents succeeded. Although Meristo et al.
(2012) did not directly examine the social experiences of
these infants, recent evidence suggests that interactions between
hearing mothers and their deaf infants involve significantly fewer
cognitive terms (e.g., think, know) and connected turns than
do interactions between hearing mothers and hearing infants
(Morgan et al., 2014). Given that these factors predict older
children’s performance on elicited-response tasks (e.g., Ensor and
Hughes, 2008), these findings provide suggestive, albeit indirect,
evidence that differences in social experience can affect early
false-belief performance.
Ongoing work in our lab provides more direct support for
this relationship: parents view a picture book (Taumoepeau and
Ruffman, 2006) with their 2.5-year-old child and we measure
the percentage of their utterances that contain mental-state
terms. Preliminary results indicate that parental use of cognitive
terms predicts 2.5-year-olds’ performance in both verbal (Roby
and Scott, 2015) and non-verbal (Roby and Scott, 2016a)
non-elicited-response tasks: children who hear more cognitive
terms more readily anticipate the behavior of a mistaken
agent. Although additional research is needed to determine
the causal mechanism behind this relationship, these findings
are consistent with the notion that children who frequently
engage in conversations about others’ thoughts and beliefs
more readily attend to belief-relevant information within a
scene and more quickly retrieve an agent’s false belief when
necessary. These results suggest that parental use of mental-
state language is related to false-belief performance prior to
the preschool years, and that this relationship extends to non-
elicited-response false-belief tasks (for related evidence see
Johnson et al., 2007; Taumoepeau and Ruffman, 2008; Newton
et al., in press).
Second, social factors should continue to facilitate false-
belief understanding after the preschool years. Support for
this prediction comes from several recent studies suggesting
that elementary-school children’s personal use of mental-state
language is correlated with their false-belief understanding, and
that training accurate use of this language improves false-
belief performance (e.g., Grazzani and Ornaghi, 2012; Lecce
et al., 2014; Bianco et al., 2016). Recent work in our lab
suggests that this association persists into adulthood: adults
who use more mental-state language when describing social
images are faster at accurately predicting the behavior of
an agent in an avoidance false-belief task, suggesting that
these individuals more readily attend to mental-state relevant
information and are faster at retrieving mental states under
time pressure (Roby and Scott, 2016b; see also Lecce et al.,
2015).
CONCLUSION
Here we have provided the first attempt at reconciling the well-
established associations between social factors and preschoolers’
false-belief performance with the mentalistic claim that false-
belief understanding emerges in infancy. We have outlined
several ways that social experiences facilitate the use of mental-
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state concepts across the lifespan. Consistent with this account,
a growing body of evidence suggests that social experiences
contribute to false-belief performance both before and after the
preschool years.
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